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VIRGINIA COMMENTS
separate and he could have objected to the agreement at that time.
Furthermore, the accused did not request to be present at the con-
ference, and there was no objection to his absence at the time of the
trial or on appeal. The Supreme Court of Virginia, when consider-
ing the right of an accused to be present at a conference in the judge's
chambers, laid down the following rule:
"The prisoner's right of personal presence in a felony case
throughout the trial from arraignment to sentence, when any-
thing is done that can affect his interest, is an inalienable one.
It is to be rigidly and jealously guarded. Yet, in its protec-
tion and enforcement, it must not be so enlarged as to exceed its
true scope and thereby made to include all inquiry into the con-
sideration of purely legal matters by the trial judge which
are in fact and reality merely careful and prudent preparation
for the resumption and conduct of the trial."42
In conclusion, the Near situation is closely analogous to other
conference situations which have held the presence of the accused not
to be essential, and there are, in addition, other factors which strongly
support such a holding in the Near case. It is submitted that Near's ab-
sence did not constitute a violation of Virginia law, and that this Vir-
ginia law insures due process to the accused.
ROBERT T. MITCHELL, JR.
PREFERENCES TO DIRECTORS OF INSOLVENT
CORPORATIONS
At common law it was settled that an insolvent debtor could prefer
certain creditors over others.' This general rule still applies, with
some limitations.2 Until the commencement of bankruptcy or other
liquidation proceedings, 3 a debtor has the right to dispose of his
property, to use it to secure and pay his debts, and the right to prefer
one of his creditors over others.4
i88 Va. at 592-93, 5o S.E.2d at 411-12.
'Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223, 242 (igog); Huntley v. Kingman, 152 U.S. 527, 532
(1894); Bradley v. Farwell, 3 Fed. Cas. 1146 (No. 1779) (C.C.D. Mass. 1874); Catlin
v. Eagle Bank, 6 Conn. 233 (1826). See Va. Code Ann. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 1959);
i5 A Fletcher, Corporations § 7423 (Repl. Vol. 1938).2See generally, 15A Fletcher, Corporations §§ 7421-23 (Rep]. Vol. 1938); 2 Glenn,
Fraudulent Conveyances & Preferences § 384 (rev. ed. 194o.
aFor example, the receivership created upon the debtor's death.
4Merillat v. Hensey, 221 U.S. 333 (1911); Irving Trust Co. v. Kamisky, 19 F.
Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). See also, Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885); Hannan
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Problems arise, however, where the preferred creditor is an officer
and director of the corporation which is indebted to him. Under those
circumstances the weight of authority is against preferences, al-
though the underlying reason is often obscured. Such a situation was
presented by the recent Virginia case of Darden v. George G. Lee Co.5
Darden was a director and secretary-treasurer of the Ricks Company
and had personally advanced $22,5oo during a creditors' arrangement
in 1958. In 196o, the corporation became insolvent and Darden de-
cided to liquidate. There were only two creditors, Darden and the
Lee Company. When it became apparent that the assets of the Ricks
Company would be insufficient to cover both debts, Darden took an
assignment of all the company's accounts receivable, the sole remain-
ing asset of the insolvent corporation, thus leaving nothing from which
the Lee Company could satisfy the debt due to it.
The assignment was set aside as a fraudulent conveyance by the
Circuit Court of Princess Anne County. The Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia agreed with the lower court that:
"The obvious and inevitable effect of this transaction was to
delay and hinder the creditor, Lee Company, from satisfying
its claim. Because of his position, the defendant Darden is
chargeable with that intent."6
The basic law on fraudulent conveyances is the 157o English
statute of 13 Elizabeth, which proscribed conveyances made with
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud other creditors. The Virginia
statute,7 like those of many other jurisdictions, closely parallels 13
Elizabeth in treating all conveyances made with such intent as fraudu-
lent and void, if the transferee had knowledge of the debtor's intentS
As the court in Darden pointed out:
v. Hardee, 69 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Salem Trust Co. v. Federal Nat'l Bank,
ii F. Supp. 1o5 (D. Mass. 1934). A preference, as such, is not necessarily a fraudu-
lent conveyance. Lyons Bank & Trust Co. v. Tuxedo State Bank, 89 Ind. App.
269, 166 N.E. 254 (1929); 1 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances & Preferences § 289 (rev.
ed. 1940), where the author points out that to allow another creditor, acting in his
own interest, to set aside a preferential transfer would amount to substituting him
as the preferred party.
'2o4 Va. 1o8, 129 S.E.2d 897 (1963).
02o4 Va. at 112, 129 S.E.2d at 9oo.
Wa. Code Ann. § 55-8o (Repl. Vol. 1959).
"It is not enough that the purpose of the grantor be fraudulent. Knowledge of
such purpose must be brought home to the grantee. Hutcheson v. Savings Bank
129 Va. 281, 105 S.E. 677 (192). It is not necessary, however, to prove the grantee
had positive knowledge of the grantor's fraudulent intent-it is sufficient to show
he had knowledge of facts which should have put him on notice. Ibid. See also,
Crowder v. Crowder, 125 Va. 8o, 99 S.E. 746 (1919).
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"Merely because the preference hinders creditors is not sufficient
reason under the Virginia statute to set aside an assignment as
it applies to a purchaser for a valuable consideration. However,
it is sufficient if the assignee.., had notice of the fact that the
assignment was made with 'intent to hinder.'-9
In order to set aside a preference as a fraudulent conveyance, it
is necessary to show: (i) the debtor did not act in good faith, but
rather his sole purpose was to hinder and delay his other creditors,10
and, (2) the preferred creditor had notice of the debtor's intent."
It might be noted that every preferential transfer necessarily hinders
and delays other creditors in the collection of their claims, and it
seems not unlikely that many preferred creditors are aware of this
hindering effect. But, a preferential transfer will not be set aside
merely because the transferee realizes that he has been preferred,
12
or knows that the debtor is insolvent 3 or that the transfer has com-
pletely exhausted the debtor's assets. 14 If the debtor's purpose is to
pay or secure one of his bona fide creditors, the transaction amounts
to a valid preference and the hindering effect on other creditors has
been held merely incidental thereto.' 5 But, the question arises, how
do the courts decide what the debtor's intent is? The court, in Darden,
did not attempt to answer this question but held, as a matter of law,
that because of his position, Darden was chargeable with the intent
to hinder and delay the other creditor.16
-o4 Va. at 112, 129 S.E.2d at 899-goo.
"OAs a general rule, an insolvent debtor may make a valid conveyance to pay
or secure a bona fide debt, if that is his sole purpose, even though such conveyance
may and is intended by the grantor to give a preference over other creditors.
Surratt v. Eskridge, 131 Va. 325, io8 S.E. 677 (1921). But, if the debtor's sole
purpose is to hinder, delay or defraud other creditors, the conveyance is voidable,
even though made upon a valuable consideration. Coder v. Arts, 213 U.S. 223 (1909).
See also, Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
2 See note 8 supra. The good faith grantee who has given value will be pro-
tected. See, for example, the Virginia statute which says: "This section shall not
affect the title of a purchaser for valuable consideration, unless it appear that
he had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor or of the fraud
rendering void the title of such grantor." Va. Code Ann. § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
"Surratt v. Eskridge, 131 Va. 325, io8 S.E. 677 (1921).
"Even if a vendor was insolvent in the vendee's knowledge, the vendee acting
in good faith could purchase personal property without a duty to see that the pur-
chase price went to the vendee's creditors. Gaspee Cab, Inc. v. McGovern, 51 R.I.
247, 153 Ati. 870 (1931).
"An individual may turn out part or the whole of his property in payment of
his debts, and in so doing may prefer creditors." Reichwald v. Commercial Hotel Co.,
106 III. 439, 451 (1883)-
"See, note 17 infra.
"2o4 Va. io8 at 112, 129 S.E.2d 897 at 9oo (1963). In Reed v. McIntyre, 98 U.S.
5o7 (1878), the court pointed out that such an intent was often conclusively pre-
1964]
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Debtor-creditor law developed so as to reward the diligent creditor
who reached his debtor's assets ahead of the other creditors. The
principle of equal distribution of assets among creditors by law does
not arise until bankruptcy or other liquidation proceedings are
commenced. Until the commencement of such proceedings, a creditor's
only assurance of satisfaction is to win the race for priority. The more
diligent creditors are rewarded with preferential payments. The
preference has been protected as being a necessary incident of the credi-
tor's right to seek his own remedy outside of judicial proceedings.
It would be anomalous to say that a creditor must lose merely be-
cause he has been voluntarily paid.'
7
The scramble for position may not be the most satisfactory way for
creditors to protect their interests, but, at least in theory, each
creditor has an equal opportunity to reach his debtor's assets. How-
ever, when one of the creditors has an advantage, not shared by other
creditors, so that his priority is virtually assured, the equilibrium
among creditors is upset. Under such circumstances, the competition
in the diligence race becomes manifestly unfair.
By the overwhelming weight of authority, directors of an insol-
vent corporation who are also creditors of the corporation may not
use their positions of special knowledge and power to grant them-
selves preferences or advantages over other creditors.' 8 Some jurisdic-
tions have enacted statutes specifically prohibiting all preferences,
no matter to whom they are made.19 Some jurisdictions, without
sumed, "if the assignment contained provisions inconsistent with good faith, or
so unreasonable and unusual in their character as to justify the conclusion that
it was.. a mere 'trick or contrivance to defeat creditors'."
17"If, as must be conceded, he has the right to pay one creditor in preference
to another, even where he is aware of his inability to pay all in full-in other
words, where he is insolvent-there is no just reason why, in making provision for
all by way of assignment, he may not make special provision for some." Huntley
v. Kingman, 152 U.S. 527, 532 (1894). See also Reed v. McIntyre, note 16 supra.
"8Jackman v. Newbold, 28 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1928); Stuart v. Larson, 298 Fed.
223 (8th Cir. 1924) (which contains a good review of the principal authorities on
this subject); Lippincott v. Shaw Carriage Co., 25 Fed. 577 (C.C.D. Ind. 1885).
See also, City Nat'l Bank v. Goshen Woolen Mills Co., 35 Ind. App. 562, 69 N.E.
206 (19o3), for an opinion which cites an extraordinary number of cases in sup-
port of this general rule. See generally, Annot., 19 A.L.R. 320 (1922).
"Arkansas: Ark. Stat. § 64-801 ('957); Kentucky Rev. Stat. § 379.060 (1963);
Maryland: Md. Ann. Code art. 47, § 14 (1957); Massachusetts: Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
so9A, § 4 (1954); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:14-2 (1937); New Mexico: N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 27-1-1 (1953). These statutes all contain provisions excepting certain
debts-typically laborer's wages.
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such a statute, adhere to the "trust fund doctrine," 20 which holds
that on insolvency the corporation assets become a trust fund which
the directors, as trustees, must distribute pro rata among all the credi-
tors.21 Other courts, while not holding that the directors are technical
trustees, say that they hold their powers in trust for the benefit of
creditors. 22 Some courts have denied preferences to directors on the
ground that they are fiduciaries and, as such, cannot use their po-
sition to secure an advantage for themselves.23 In Howe, Brown &
Co. v. Sanford Fork & Tool Co.,24 the court denied a preference to a
director because of "sound public policy and a sense of common fair-
ness.... They ought not to be competitors in a contest of which they
must be the judges."2 5 In the leading case of Jackman v. Newbold,26
-'The "trust fund doctrine" was enunciated by Justice Story in Wood v.
Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (No. 17944) (C.C.D. Me. 1824). For a full discussion
of the trust fund doctrine, see 15A Fletcher, Corporations §§ 7369-70 (Rep. Vol.
1938).
"It is well settled that the officers and directors of an insolvent corporaton
hold its assets as a trust fund for the benefit of its creditors, and that they will
not be allowed to take advantage of their position, and the superior opportunity
of information which it affords, to secure an advantage for themselves over other
creditors." Wigginton v. Auburn Wagon Co., 33 F.2d 496, 5o (4 th Cir. 1929). See
also, Richardson v. Green, 133 U.S. 30 (i8go); Standard Chemical Oil Co. v. Fair-
cloth, 20oo Ala. 657, 77 So. 31 (1917); Rouse v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 46 Ohio
St. 493, 22 N.E. 293 (1889).
2"These powers are held by them in trust for all the creditors, and cannot be
used by them for their own benefit." Bonney v. Tilley, 1o9 Cal. 346, 42 Pac. 439, 440
(1895).
'In Sutton Mfg. Co. v. Hutchinson, 63 Fed. 496 (C.C.D. Ind. 1894), it was said,
"Although such directors and officers are not technical trustees, they hold, in respect
of the property under their control, a fiduciary relation to creditors .... This rule is
imperatively demanded by the principle that one who has the possession and con-
trol of property for the benefit of others-and surely an insolvent corporation,
which has ceased to do business holds its property for the benefit of creditors-
may not dispose of it for his own special advantage...." Id. at 5oi-02. See also,
Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 163 Md. 442, 163 At. 480 (1932); Taylor v. Mitchell,
8o Minn. 492, 83 N.W. 418 (19oo), in which the court draws a distinction between
the situation where the officers and directors take security contemporaneously with
the giving of a loan. The general rule is that a corporation may secure a director
for a contemporaneous loan. See generally, Annot., 5 A.L.R. 561 (1920).
"44 Fed. 231 (C.C.D. Ind. 189o).
'Id. at 233. The court further pointed out: "Whether or not such preferences
are fairly given is an impractical inquiry, because there can be in ordinary cases
no means of discovering the truth; and consequently the presumption to the
contrary should in every case be conclusive." But this case was later revised, the
Supreme Court ruling that it was "going too far to hold that a corporation may
not give a mortgage to its directors who have lent their credit to it, to induce a
continuance of the loan of that credit... at a time when the corporation ... is a
going concern, and is intending and expecting to continue in business." Sanford
Fork S. Tool Co v. Howe, 157 U.S. 312, 320 (1895).
028 F.2d io7 (8th Cir. 1928).
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the court observed: "The law applicable to this situation is not dif-
ficult. It is merely common sense and common honesty, applied in the
interest of fair dealing."27 The court, in the principal case, refers to
the rule against preference to directors as, "simple justice."28
But the courts are not unanimous in denying directors the right
to prefer themselves. In Wyman v. Bowman 29 it was stated:
"Contracts and transactions between individuals and corpora-
tions of which they are directors or officers, which are fair, which
are made in good faith, which do not secure to the individuals
any undue or unjust benefit or advantage, and in which the
interest of the individuals and the duty of the officials work
in unison for the welfare of the corporation, are valid and
enforceable both at law and in equity."3 0
Other courts have said that, although such transactions will be closely
scrutinized, a director may prefer himself if he acts in "good faith."3 1
In those jurisdictions which have not completely prohibited all
preferences, the courts have nevertheless denied them to directors on
various grounds. It appears that preferences to directors are not al-
lowed where the circumstances of the case indicate that other credi-
tors have thereby been denied an equal opportunity to reach the
corporate assets. The courts seem to solve the difficult problem of
the director's intent by deciding whether the overall fairness of the
diligence race was impaired, and if so, then they find that the
directors intended to hinder and delay the other creditors.
In Darden, as has already been pointed out, the court found that,
because of his position, Darden was "chargeable with that intent." But
the court did not hold the preference void merely because Darden
was a director. In addition, Darden was in complete control of the
financial affairs of the Ricks Company. Darden relied chiefly on the
early case of Planters Bank v. Whittle,3 2 in which the Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals upheld the right of a director to grant him-
M'Id. at iii.
2sDarden v. George G. Lee Co., 204 Va. 1o8, 112, 129 S.E.2d 897, 9oo (1963).




"Corey v. Wadsworth, 1i8 Ala. 488, 25 So. 503 (1899) (actual fraud); Buell v.
Buckingham, 16 Iowa 284 (1864); Beck v. Semones' Adm'r, 145 Va. 429, 134 S.E.
677 (1926); Planters Bank v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737 (1884); Alexandria Savings Inst.
v. Thomas, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 483 (1877). See also, Stuart v. Larson, 298 Fed. 223
(8th Cir. 1924).
"'78 Va. 737 (1884).
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self a preference. 33 But the court held that the facts in the principal
case were more in keeping with those in Certain-Teed Products Corp.
v. Wallinger,34 in which it had been said that Planters Bank and the
several other Virginia cases allowing such preferential transfers, "do
not go so far as to authorize a preference which has been obtained
by a creditor in complete control of the affairs of a corporate debtor."35
That this was the point upon which the Darden case turned seems
clear from the language of the opinion.
"The evidence in this case clearly shows that when Darden
created the assignment of the accounts receivable to himself
on July 28, 196o, he was in complete control of the affairs of
the Ricks Company so as to bring him under the rule laid down
in the Certain-Teed Products case rather than our holding in
the Planters Bank case."3 6
Thus, the court put its finger on the precise factor which upset
the equilibrium between the two creditors, and held that because
of Darden's complete control of the affairs of the Ricks Company, he
must have intended to hinder and delay the Lee Company. But the
court did not go so far as to hold, as a matter of law, that he could
not have acted in good faith by virtue of his position as a director
who secured himself in preference to another creditor. This, it is
submitted, would be the better rule.
It seems safe to say that the assets of many small, family corpora-
tions are augmented from time to time by loans from their officers
and directors. It is important that outside creditors should feel that
they are in as good a position with respect to the corporate assets as
the directors who may be aware of impending disaster. Actual bad
faith or intent to hinder is difficult to prove. Such difficulties could be
eliminated in Virginia, as they are in other jurisdictions,3 7 by a rule
that, as a matter of law, a director is deemed to act in bad faith when
he accepts a preference from an insolvent corporation, because of the
inherent probability of unfairness in the diligence race.
RONALD J. KAYE
'The court went on to say, "Of course in such cases... [directors] must act
with the utmost good faith, and the transactions to be upheld must be free from the
taint of fraud or suspicion." Id. at 740.
u89 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1937).
"-Id. at 435.
._o4 Va. at i2-i3, 129 S.E.2d at 9oo.
3rFor example, Georgia has a statute which says: "Directors primarily repre-
sent the corporation and its stockholders, but when the corporation becomes in-
solvent they are bound to manage the remaining assets for the benefit of its credi-
tors, and cannot in any manner use their powers for the purpose of obtaining a
preference or advantage to themselves." Ga. Code Ann. § 22-709 (1936).

